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Abstract—The ISO/IEC 62351 standard provides a set of
security controls and protocols for communications in smart
grids based on the ISO/IEC 60870, 61850, and DNP3 standards.
It offers the protection goals of confidentiality, integrity, and
authentication. In this paper we perform a systematic study of
the ISO/IEC 62351-3 standard regarding the use of public key
infrastructure in smart grid communication. We show that the
standard at present does not align with the quality of service re-
quirements for performance and interoperability in the ISO/IEC
61850 standard and thereby may jeopardise effective operations.
We demonstrate that it is possible to claim conformance with
the ISO/IEC 62351-3 standard but be vulnerable to denial of
service attacks arising from insufficiently specified behaviour for
public key certificate validation and revocation. Further issues
can give rise to downgrade attacks against cipher suites and
protocols used, allowing a man-in-the-middle attacks contrary to
the standard’s claims.
I. INTRODUCTION
The smart devices that are currently being integrated into
power systems are degrading the ‘’air gap” security principle
that has been used by the sector for the past few decades. The
guiding principle of security through obscurity of supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) protocols is no longer
tenable, as their communications networks are beginning to
interact with internet technologies. Whilst both the academic
and industrial research communities are now focusing on
solving the unique security challenges faced by smart grids,
there is very little focus dedicated to checking if the security
promises made by the various protocols used in the space
hold true. Securing the protocols could prevent some of the
theorised attacks against smart grids.
The following analysis builds upon previous work[29] and
looks at the security promises made by IEC62351-3[20]. This
section of the IEC62351 is designed to encrypt the data packets
being sent across a communications network that use either
IEC60870, IEC61850, or DNP3 substation automation stan-
dards. It adds the security promises of confidentiality, integrity,
and message level authentication to the communications pro-
tocols it is deployed on. The protocol describes how smart grid
TCP/IP communication networks should be secured via public
key infrastructure. The kinds of communications that it will be
applied to are those that don’t need a real time response, such
as sampled values (SV) in IEC61850. IEC62351-6, the section
that describes how IEC61850 will be secured, recommends
that ‘’applications using GOOSE and IEC 61850-9-2 and
requiring 4msec response times, multicast configurations, and
low CPU overhead” should not use encryption[21]. IEC62351-
3 claims that it will counter man-in-the-middle and replay
attacks, along with negating any eavesdropping attempts. The
key contribution of this paper is to show that these promises
are not upheld if certain policy omission regarding the certifi-
cate authority (CA) trust networks aren’t fixed, which could
allow attackers to implement various denial of service attacks
using using the system’s logic whilst still being compliant with
the protocol.
It is shown that the approach in IEC62351-3 of just declaring
the use transport layer security(TLS), message authentication
codes(MAC), and CAs as a way of fulfilling its promises
still leaves the network vulnerable, as it neglects to com-
ment on CA implementation, certificate validation and revo-
cation policies. As well undermining its security promises,
it is shown that these omissions come into clash with the
IEC61850-5 quality of service requirement of interoperability
of devices[22].
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section
II describes the work currently being done on the security
of IEC62351. Section III briefly describes how IEC62351-3
implements TLS, and its supporting standards. Section IV then
describes omissions that could be used in attacks against the
trust network. Section V describes how downgrade attacks are
possible in the current standard, before giving a conclusions
and a direction for future work in section VI.
II. RELATED WORKS
Most of the research into IEC62351 security is usually
part of an analysis into the state of either general smart
grid/SCADA, or IEC61850 security [28] [11] [9]. It is usually
presented as a solution to the taxonomy of problems that the
authors have identified in their reviews.
However, there is some research that looks at the challenges
faced in implementing IEC62351. Tawde et. al.[24] propose a
bump in the wire key management mechanism to implement
IEC62351-5, which is designed to extend the security promises
of IEC60870 and DNP3. They propose connecting the bump in
the wire devices to the remote terminal units and management
terminal units on the network topology. They claim that this
would be a practical way of bringing legacy hardware in line
with the standard, but make no consideration as to whether the
added latency will violate the quality of service requirements
of IEC60870 or DNP3.
Some work has been done on how IEC62351-4 provides
security for the manufacturing message specification (MMS)
model which is used in IEC61850 and IEC60870. Fries et.
al.[11] identify that MMS messages that use multiple transport
layer connections undermine the promise of integrity, as it is
assumed that an intermediary in the chain is trusted. They
propose introducing security sessions into the MMS proto-
col to restore this promise. Ruland & Sassmannshausen[16]
propose adding the security promises of non-repudiation and
traceability to IEC62351-4 to enhance MMS security. They
argue that the authentication of communication partner does
not guarantee authentication of the origin of data transmitted.
They propose encoding XML non-repudiation tokens into the
data sent between the client and the server. These tokens will
contain proof of authorship and a timestamp.
Some research has been done on how IEC62351-3’s public
key infrastructure key management schemes could be imple-
mented. Zhao et. al.[30] points out that certificate revocation
is not actually part of IEC 62351-3, and propose using a
broadcast encryption media key block to secure the commu-
nications in a hierarchical device structure which would allow
them to revoke a device’s certificate. However, they provide
no proof as to if their algorithm actually meets the security
promises of IEC62351-3. Fuloria et. al.[12] discuss the var-
ious possible encryption choices, and their implementations,
given the limited computational resources the communications
network will have. They also develop a broad threat model
with which encryption can defend against. However, their
analysis overlooks what could potentially go wrong in key
update algorithms. They conclude that encryption may be too
great a burden to implement on smart grid network.
No further works have been found on IEC62351-3 security.
The purpose of the following analysis is to show that if no
decision is made on the public key infrastructure’s implemen-
tation of certificate revocation update frequency and process-
ing overhead, then, regardless of the chosen key management
topology, the protocols security promises will not be upheld.
III. IEC62351-3’S IMPLEMENTATION OF TLS AND
PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE
As it currently stands the IEC62351-3 deployment of
public key infrastructure defers to the TLS standard, and
its dependencies, on how it should be implemented across
its trust architecture. The documentation states that it will
support the current version of TLS, which is predominately
TLS 1.2, as well as any subsequent iterations, such as the
under development TLS 1.3[15]. However, it also allows
for backwards compatibility up to TLS 1.0. Assuming that
the implementer of this trust architecture uses TLS 1.2, the
possible features used in its deployment shall be derived
below.
The TLS implementation used must support bi-directional
certificate authentication of each party in a session. This
means any implementation of the TLS handshake algorithm
used on the smart grid’s communications network should have
the server send a ‘CertificateRequest’ message before it sends
its ‘ServerHelloDone’ message. When the client is initiating
the handshake protocol with a server, they define a list of
cipher suites that they wish to use in the following session.
The only requirement that IEC62351-3 definitively makes
is that a ‘’cipher suite that specifies NULL for encryption
shall not be used for communications”[20]. The only other
assertion it makes is it would prefer the manufactures to
use a SHA cipher suite and avoid MD5. Whilst TLS 1.3
removes support for MD5 and SHA-224[15], IEC6235-3
makes no references to the documentation that updates the
list of cipher suites TLS 1.2 can use. It explicitly points to
the ancillary standards regarding the renegotiation extension
and the dropping of support of SSL 2.0, but overlooks the
one that revokes the use of RC4 suite[14]. If that is not
included, RC4 becomes an acceptable standard to use in the
implementation which would make the TLS implementation
vulnerable to historically known attack vectors.
For the TLS handshake algorithm to work there has to
be some form of public key infrastructure in place to allow
parties to authenticate each others identities. The current
implemention of a CA’s certificate revocation lists (CRL) on
the trust architecture that TLS 1.2 use is described in the
RFC5280[5] standard. RFC5280 states that entity connected
to a certificate can either be an individual or a computational
device. RFC5280 is also the standard that IEC62351-3 defers
to for its CRL infrastructure. However, this standard does
not present any algorithm for how a device can validate a
certificate it receives.
The documentation for IEC62351-3 suggests that the
facilitation of the smart grid’s public key infrastructure shall
be done either by a network of localised CAs storing a
CRL, or some form of the Online Certificate Status Protocol
(OCSP)[20]. For the administration of the networks CRL’s
IEC62351-3 defers to best practices of key management that
are laid out in IEC9594-8[25] and IEC62351-9[23], which
is currently under development. IEC9594-8 provides some
considerations that should be made when a trust architecture
is first set up. It makes no concrete declarations on what
an implementer has to do. For CRL implementations it
provides consideration for the deployment of trust anchors,
certification paths, key generation, and CRLs. Whilst it
acknowledges that OCSP is an alternative method of
certificate validation to the distribution of a CRL, it does
not make any considerations on its implementation. Whilst
IEC62351-3 states that an OCSP algorithm can be used as
part of its public key infrastructure, it makes no reference
to a specific implementation. Inferring from IEC9594-8 it
could be assumed that it is referring to RFC6960[17], but it
could also be an OCSP stapling implementation described
in RFC6066[7], which is referenced by IEC6235-3. Whilst
both OCSP implementations differ in the way they distribute
the onus of processing the OCSP request, they both depend
on having a secured and honest CA server on the trust
architecture to manage a CRL. Regardless of the certificate
revocation mechanism that is implemented it must be noted
that any requests sent to a CA for information regarding a
certificates validity is transmitted via an unencrypted channel.
IV. IEC62351-3 POLICY OMISSIONS REGARDING PUBLIC
KEY INFRASTRUCTURE
Whilst IEC62351-3 does go some way to securing the com-
munication networks deployed using IEC60870, IEC61850,
and DNP3, it overlooks certain key areas that would allow
it to fulfil its promises. IEC62351-3 secures the data packets
transmitted using the TLS protocol, but that depends upon
the proper implementation of public key infrastructure. The
standard infers that it will deploy either a CRL or an OCSP
algorithm. However both IEC62351-3 and TLS abdicate re-
sponsibility on the best practise for the operation of a CA.
Whilst IEC62351-3 does say it will deploy CAs within the
network, it omits to lay out any common policy on how they
should be operated. If these omissions persists then it could
undermine IEC61850-5’s quality of service requirement of
interoperability of devices on the network, as well as its own
security promises. It is the concern of the authors that without
a proper administrative policy on how the CAs are deployed,
then an attacker could circumvent the protection provided by
TLS.
Shown below are the possible problems that can arise with
the major implementations of trust architecture, CRLs, OCSP,
and OCSP stapling. Potential solutions to these problems
are suggested. After that, the overview turns to the specific
considerations that need to be taken into account when public
key infrastructure is deployed on a smart grid’s communication
network.
A. Problems with CRL’s
Below are potential attack vectors that can arise when using
CRL based trust architecture:
• Public key infrastructure is only as robust as the topology
of the trust architecture that it is deployed on[26]. The
correct choice of trust topology can help provide a greater
guarantee that a device on the network can authenticate
the certificates it receives in a TLS handshake. For ex-
ample, if the trust topology implemented is a hierarchical
one, then an attacker could mount a denial of service
against the promise of authentication. They could deny a
targeted device access to the CA’s available on its branch,
compromising it’s availability to the grid.
• Owners of trust infrastructure need some way of checking
that a CA on the network is legitimate, and should have
the authority to issue certificates. If the CA cannot be
trusted to act honestly when checking the veracity of the
identity of an entity requesting a certificate, and for them
to maintain an accurate CRL, then the promises of both
authentication and integrity cannot be upheld.[10]
Although there haven’t been any reported cases where
a CA has acted in a intentionally dishonest manner
we can deduce the consequences of not validating their
honesty by looking at examples of CA error from recent
history[2]. In 2013 Tu¨rktrust accidentally marked two
customer certificates as CA certificates. Someone then
used one these on a network gateway, which allowed them
to intercept and decrypt traffic leaving it. In 2012 Trust-
Wave issued an intermediate CA certificate to a customer
that then used it to generate end-user certificates, that
allowed them to decrypt traffic. In 2011 both Comodo and
DigiNotar CAs networks were compromised. In the first
instance the attackers issued themselves nine certificates
for popular domains, however only one of them was seen
deployed in the wild. In the latter incident, the malicious
certificates were used to implement a man in the middle
attack, an attack which IEC62351-3 says it prevents,
against Iranian users of Gmail.
The above cases show that if the CA cannot be trusted
to perform its signing function honestly, then it compro-
mises the global trust architecture.
• Certificates used in a trust network should only be ac-
cepted at the beginning of a session, if it can be shown
that it has come from a trusted CA. If a client is unaware
of how a CA acts when it receives a certificate signing
request, then they are uncertain in the level of trust they
can place in any certificates it receives. If anyone can
get a certificate for their device without any check that
the person has permission to make a certificate signing
request, then the promise of authentication cannot be
upheld. If there is no validation by the CA of a requester,
then an impersonation attack[4] can take place. This is
further complicated when the party requesting the CA to
sign a certificate is a device rather than an individual.
This means that there is no guarantee that a device on
the network is sending its data to a legitimate party.
• CRL requests are sent unencrypted across the commu-
nications network. This problem could allow an attacker
to violate the promises of confidentiality, integrity and
authentication by manipulating or intercepting packets,
via a man in the middle attack. Due to this weakness in
the CRL algorithm, it is possible for an attacker to mount
a denial of service attack against a device. As the CRL
response has no boundary on its length[5], an attacker
could reply a device’s request for an updated CRL with
a packet that far exceeds the overhead it can dedicate to
the task of processing.
B. Problems with the OCSP algorithm
The OCSP algorithm addresses the final issue shown in
section IV-A. By having fixed constant message complexity,
as indicated by the responses content-length header[17], an
attacker can no longer send a reply that would exceed a devices
dedicated overhead. However, the OCSP documentation makes
no comment on the optimal latency a device should allow
Client Attacker CA Server
CRL(tbsCertificate[x],sig)
CRL(tbsCertificate[y])
Fig. 1: The attacker sends an array of garbage data for the
device to process. Where x and y are the number of bits in
the array, and y  x
when waiting for a reply. The behaviour of what a device
should do if it receives no or an invalid reply can improve
how effective it is at upholding its security promises. Without
any guidance on this issue a device could be made to accept
a revoked or expired certificate by an attacker, which would
undermine the promises of integrity and authentication. As the
OCSP response is not transmitted over an encrypted channel,
like CRLs, an attacker can modify the response data packets.
If the attacker changes the response to ‘tryLater’ the client
doesn’t require a signed response, and, depending on the
implementation, the algorithm may ‘soft fail’ and accept the
certificate[8].




Fig. 2: A session diagram of the ‘tryLater’ attack.
C. Problems with the OCSP stapling algorithm
OCSP stapling is designed to allow CA’s to reduce the
amount of overhead they dedicate to the requests they receive.
It achieves this by allowing the certificate holder to query the
CA’s database itself to get a signed timestamped validation
response. However the binding of the certificate and the CA’s
validation signature must be completely unalterable, otherwise
it then leaves verification in the hands of an attacker. This
would undermine any promise of authentication. Possible ways
of achieving this binding are described in section IV-D.
Another problem with this validation methodology is there
needs to be a redundancy in the trust architecture if the server
is unable to get their certificate signed and timestamped by a
CA it should no longer be available to communicate with as
no device an authenticate its identity, which undermines the
IEC61850-5 promise of availability.
D. Potential Solutions and Considerations
To secure the trust architecture of any communications
network using IEC62351-3, the protocol would need to go
beyond what is written in the referenced public key infras-
tructure specifications. To improve the security of the CA, the
protocol would have to declare the best practices expected of
any entity issuing certificates on the communication before
allowing them access[19].
To prevent the ‘soft fail’ scenario of the ‘tryLater’ attack
in OCSP, IEC6235-3 should make it clear that if a device
receives a ‘tryLater’, revoked, or even no response that it
should not continue the session with the other party, as there
is no guarantee of authentication.
To make sure that the binding of a certificate and the
CA’s validation is unalterable in an OCSP stapling trust
system, there are two possible ways of deploying it. The
first method would be to create a dedicated private CA for
the grid’s communications network. This way an intelligent
electronic device can reduce the overhead needed to check
that the CA is a valid entity, as if it wasn’t the private CA
it would just end the session. For this approach to work
the private CA would have to develop stringent policies on
how it manages its private key(s), as if those are lost then
the networks entire trust model would be compromised[13].
It should also be noted that most commercial CA lists
used in web browsers are cultivated to be used in as many
territories as possible, some of which may decide to use
its trust infrastructure to perform man in the middle attacks
against its own citizens. If one of these states CA’s is used
on the smart grid trust network, it could be used for similar
purposes[18]. The other method is bind the DNSsec[6] of the
communications network with the trust topology. By making
a specific tier of the grid’s DNS architecture the only CA for
the tier immediately below it, a chain of trust can be built
between tiers.
It must be noted that only one of the two previous suggestions
should be implemented at a time. Using them in combination
would allow the private CA to undermine the DNSsec chain
of trust as it would allow CA’s from any tier be accepted.
E. Considerations that need to be made for Smart Grid
implementation
There are two challenges faced by any public key infras-
tructure that is implemented on a smart grid’s communication
network. The first is how frequently an intelligent electronic
device should receive a copy of the latest CRL[27]. A device
is vulnerable to communicating with a malicious server that
has a presented an invalid certificate between the time it is
revoked and when the device receives the new CRL. Most web
CAs send out an updated CRL every seven days. This leaves
a web browser potentially vulnerable for six days between
updates. It is conceivable that the CRL wont be sent until
it has reached a significant number of revocations. Having
a definitive policy on the time between CRL updates would
remove any uncertainty as to when a device will receive the
latest CRL, which would reduce the chance that it will accept
an invalid certificate.
The second problem that needs to be considered is the
overhead an intelligent electronic device can suffer when
processing a CRL request. The device must validate the CA’s
signature, perform databasing tasks every time it receives a
CRL, and parse the database to check if the certificate it
has received in a handshake is still valid. The device has
limited processing power and storage to perform these tasks,
and no consideration is made for the latency requirements in
which these tasks must be completed. Without any quality
of service requirement imposed on processing of any CRL
request, the device could be susceptible to an attacker using
revoked certificates until the CRL has been processed and
parsed. However, IEC62351-3 does make some consideration
on the storage of CRL’s. It suggests that a CRL stored on an
intelligent electronic device should be no larger than 8192
octets. Unfortunately it provides no suggested process if a
CRL is larger than this. There would be no way of remedying
an attack implemented along this vector, without external
interference, as the protocol does not allow a checking or
inability to access a CRL to end an established session[20].
V. IEC62351-3 POLICY OMISSIONS THAT COULD LEAD
TO DOWNGRADE ATTACKS
Due to the accepted development practise of choosing
interoperability of devices over security requirements, which
is enshrined in IEC61850-5, IEC6235-3 cannot guarantee the
confidentiality of data sent over its network.
The specification makes no comment on what happens
if there is no agreement during a TLS handshake when a
signature algorithm. The danger of having no policy for this
eventuality means the manufacturer could make the judgement
for their device to use on no encryption in this instance,
which attacker could exploit in an attack. A potential justifi-
cation for the manufacturer making this decision is it reduces
the overhead on the processor of the intelligent electronic
device, which would make it easier to be compliant with
IEC62351. An example of a downgrade type attack was
developed against TLS 1.2, as it was shown that a lot of
distributions were being implemented with the export grade
Diffie-Hellman 512 bit primes as a possible cipher suite. These
could be precomputed[1], therefore allowing messages to be
compromised in transit. It should be noted that IEC62351-3
wouldn’t be susceptible to this attack as 1024 bit key length
is the minimum requirement for key exchange.
IEC62351-3 should make explicitly clear what happens to
a session if there is no agreement between parties on TLS
protocol version or CA response. Whilst this comes into direct
clash with the requirements of IEC61850-5, it would guarantee
the integrity and confidentiality of the data being transmitted
over the smart grid’s network. As previously noted the protocol
provides backwards compatibility up to TLS 1.0. It would
also strengthen IEC62351-3 security promises to remove this
requirement, as these have been shown to be insecure[3].
VI. CONCLUSION
The above overview shows that the omissions in IEC62351-






Fig. 3: An example of a session downgrade after the CA server
uses an undesirable signing algorithm in its OCSP response.
compliant with the specification whilst undermining its
security promises. This can be remedied by extending
IEC62351-3 to include key management administration. It has
also been discussed that there needs to be consideration made
for what happens in case the trust infrastructure is attacked
or damaged. Decisions on the preferred topology of the trust
network or providing an algorithm on what an intelligent
electronic device should do if it fails to receive an affirmative
response from a CA server, can help the protocol uphold
its security promises. Without declaring a key management
policy an attacker can undermine the promises of message
confidentiality, integrity, and authentication. This could allow
them to send malicious commands that could lead to physical
damage being inflicted upon the grid.
It was also shown that it’s possible for a downgrade attack
to be implemented due to the interoperability requirements
of IEC61850-5. It should also be noted that the current state
of IEC62351-3 would be a hindrance interoperability, as it
leaves a lot of decision to the implementers and manufacturers
of intelligent electronic devices about the deployment of
the public key infrastructure. Without a consensus on how
the network should be operated the only way the devices
could possibly work together is at the lowest common
denominator of security. Although this overview has been
done by looking at how IEC62351 interacts with IEC61850,
there is a reasonable likelihood that the quality of service
requirements that have been used in the above analysis exist
in other communications protocols, such as IEC60870 or
DNP3.
Whilst it would be useful to be able to test the attacks
developed above, there are currently no testbed systems with
IEC62351-3 implementations. The authors plan to proceed
by following on from this paper with performing a similar
analysis on the other sections of IEC62351. Once a review
of the other sections is completed, the focus shall move to
formally proving the attacks theorised are actually possible
by using context-free grammars methods developed in a
previous work[29] to create a set of rules that prove that the
promises are not upheld.
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